Miller v. Comm Social Security by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-19-1999 
Miller v. Comm Social Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"Miller v. Comm Social Security" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 105. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/105 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed April 19, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 
HON. SHIRLEY CHATER 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 96-cv-04976) 
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 10, 1999 
 
Before: MANSMANN, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed April 19, 1999) 
 
       Joel M. Solow, Esquire 
       Freeman & Bass, P.A. 
       24 Commerce Street 
       Newark, New Jersey 07102 
 




       Faith S. Hochberg, Esquire 
       United States Attorney 
       Peter G. O'Malley, Esquire 
       Assistant United States Attorney 
       Office of United States Attorney 
       970 Broad Street 
       Newark, New Jersey 07102 
 
       --Of Counsel-- 
 
       Barbara L. Spivak, Esquire 
       Chief Counsel-Region II 
       Tomasina DiGrigoli, Esquire 
       Office of the General Counsel 
       Social Security Administration 
 
        Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Chester Miller brings this appeal asserting that the Social 
Security Administration erred in determining the onset date 
for his disability in awarding disability benefits under the 
Social Security Act. While Miller asserts several grounds of 
error, the issue necessitating clarification in this published 
opinion is whether the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
applied the appropriate legal standard in considering the 
weight to be afforded a medical report submitted by a 
physician who has a history of submitting reports with 
virtually identical language in unrelated social security 
cases.1 We hold today that while an ALJ may consider the 
fact that a report contains duplicative language as one 
factor in determining the amount of weight the report 
merits, it is erroneous for an ALJ to reject summarily a 
medical report based upon duplicative language without 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We find that Miller's other assertions of error, which relate to the 
testimony of Miller and his wife, lack merit and do not warrant lengthy 
discussion. Specifically, we find that the ALJ applied the appropriate 
legal standards in evaluating this testimony and that his conclusions on 
credibility are supported by substantial evidence. 
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considering the relationship of the medical report to the 
entire record. Because we find that the ALJ did not 
sufficiently consider the merits of one of the medical reports 
submitted in this case under this standard, we will remand 




On April 15, 1993, Miller first applied for disability 
benefits alleging total disability beginning on December 1, 
1991. The Social Security Administration initially allowed 
Miller's claim with an onset date of disability of October 2, 
1993, based upon the neuropsychological evaluation in a 
December 2, 1993, report submitted by Dr. Haydon. Miller 
timely requested reconsideration and a hearing before an 
ALJ. 
 
A hearing was held before an ALJ on June 30, 1995. 
Both Miller and his wife testified at the hearing. The ALJ 
determined that Miller was not entitled to benefits for the 
period from December 1, 1991, to October 2, 1993, because 
he failed to meet his burden of showing that he did not 
have the residual functional capacity to perform his prior 
work during the relevant time period. The ALJ specifically 
found that Miller's subjective complaints of pain during the 
relevant time period were not credible because they were 
not supported by medical evidence. In addition, the ALJ 
afforded minimal weight to three May 1993 medical reports 
submitted on behalf of Miller by Doctors Latimer, Pollack, 
and Friedman. The ALJ noted that these reports "are 
almost identical in their wording and substance to 
numerous other reports submitted by the same physicians 
in other cases . . ." and that "[t]he striking similarity of 
such reports across numerous unrelated cases undermines 
their credibility . . . ." See Record at 24. Miller timely filed 
an action in the District Court challenging the ALJ's 
determination. 
 
The District Court affirmed. On the issue of Dr. Latimer's 
May 1993 report, the District Court cited Williams v. 
Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1185 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992), in 
holding that the ALJ had the authority to afford this report 
little weight based on the submission of virtually identical 
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reports by Dr. Latimer in other cases. See District Court 
Opinion at 17. Accordingly, because the District Court 
found that the ALJ properly weighed all the evidence before 
him, the District Court held that the ALJ's determination 





Freeman & Bass, the law firm representing Miller, 
apparently has a practice of obtaining one or several 
medical reports from a small group of physicians to submit 
on behalf of their clients for both workmen's compensation 
claims and social security claims. The problem with these 
reports, as noted by numerous courts, is that the wording 
of the reports is often identical and not individually tailored 
to the firm's clients. See, e.g., Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 
1178, 1185 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992); Coria v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 
245, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1984)(Garth, J., concurring); Bradley 
v. Bowen, 667 F. Supp. 161, 167 n.2 (D.N.J. 1987); 
Franklin v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 784, 789-90 (D.N.J. 
1984); Winston v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 362, 367 (D.N.J. 
1984). Due to the repetitive nature of the diagnoses in 
these reports, some District Courts have held that ALJs are 
justified in affording them little weight. See Bradley, 667 F. 
Supp. at 167 n.2; Franklin, 598 F. Supp. at 790. 
 
This issue first drew the attention of this Court in Coria 
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 245, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1984)(Garth, J., 
concurring). In Coria, Judge Garth opined in his 
concurrence that given the nature of these reports, it is 
appropriate for an ALJ to discount the reliability of the 
physicians' conclusions and to afford such reports little, if 
any, weight. The issue was again raised in Williams v. 
Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir. 1992), where we affirmed 
a finding of no disability. In a footnote, we stated that an 
ALJ may not simply reject medical reports due to their 
similarity to other reports in unrelated litigation, but that in 
weighing the credibility of such reports, an ALJ may 
properly consider the fact that the physician made a similar 
finding in a separate action and may give little weight to 
rote medical findings in case after case. Williams, 970 F.2d 
at 1185 n.5. Judge Garth wrote an extensive concurrence 
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in Williams opining that an ALJ has the discretion to reject 
completely the boilerplate, stereotyped medical reports often 
submitted by Freeman & Bass. See Williams, 970 F.2d at 
1188-94. 
 
Aside from the foregoing dicta, we have yet to address 
specifically the issue of the appropriate weight to be given 
these types of reports. In what appears to be the sole 
published opinion from our sister courts of appeals on this 
issue, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has 
held that it is inappropriate for an ALJ to discount a 
medical report solely on the basis that certain physicians 
"almost invariably conclude that the person being examined 
is totally disabled" because such an observation, without 
supporting evidence, indicates potential bias. See Miles v. 
Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1399-1401 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 
While we agree that it is erroneous for an ALJ to reject 
every report submitted by a certain physician or lawfirm 
simply because the physician often reaches the same 
conclusion in every case, an ALJ should be afforded 
substantial discretion to give little weight to a medical 
report that was carbon-copied from previous litigation 
without taking into account the specific applicant's 
condition. We accordingly hold today that while an ALJ may 
consider the boilerplate nature of a report as one factor in 
determining the appropriate weight to afford the report, an 
ALJ may not summarily reject a report solely because it 
contains some language repetitive of portions of previously 
submitted reports. This rule permits an ALJ to afford a rote 
report little weight in the appropriate case, but requires the 
ALJ to consider all aspects of the case before rejecting the 




Applying these principles to this case, we find that the 
ALJ properly afforded the reports of Doctors Pollack and 
Friedman minimal weight but failed to consider adequately 
the merits of Dr. Latimer's report. The ALJ offered the 
following explanation in discounting these three reports: 
 
       [T]he claimant's attorney submitted several medical 
       reports which were apparently prepared in connection 
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       with a worker's compensation claim. These reports 
       were submitted by Dr. Latimer, Dr. Pollock, and Dr. 
       Friedman, in May 1993. These physicians frequently 
       submit reports in Social Security Administration cases. 
       Their findings and conclusions frequently contain 
       virtually identical wording, often refer to impairments 
       not alleged by the claimant or supported by any 
       medical evidence, and they rarely vary significantly 
       from case to case. 
 
          * * *    
 
       I have fully reviewed the reports of Doctors Pollack, 
       Latimer, and Friedman. They are almost identical in 
       their wording and substance to numerous other 
       reports submitted by the same physicians in other 
       cases. The striking similarity of such reports across 
       numerous unrelated cases undermines their credibility 
       and the objectivity of their findings and conclusions. 
       Therefore, they have minimal probative value from an 
       evidentiary standpoint and I accord little weight to 
       them. 
 
Record at 23-24. Although we see no error in this analysis 
with respect to the reports of Doctors Pollack and Friedman 
because these reports are simply boilerplate and 
unsupported by other evidence in the record, it is unclear, 
however, whether the report of Dr. Latimer suffers the same 
malady or is likewise unsubstantiated. 
 
The District Court cases that have criticized the reports 
of Doctors Pollack and Friedman quote substantive medical 
portions of these reports which are virtually identical to 
portions of these same physicians' reports on Miller. 
Compare Winston, 585 F. Supp. at 364 (quoting Dr. Pollock 
report diagnosing "neurological residuals of exposure to 
noxious fumes and dust and loud noise, also sciatic 
neuritis, and traumatic anxiety psychoneurosis, 
attributable to exposure at work"); Franklin, 598 F. Supp. 
at 792-96 (reproducing reports by Dr. Pollock containing 
same language); Franklin, 598 F. Supp. at 805-16 
(reproducing several Dr. Friedman reports diagnosing 
patients with varying symptoms as suffering from chronic 
bronchitis and hypertensive vascular disease); with Record 
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at 197 (Dr. Pollack report diagnosing Miller with 
"[n]eurological residuals of exposure to noxious fumes, 
dust, loud noise, and post-traumatic anxiety stress disorder 
. . . attributable to exposure at work."); Record at 247-50 
(Dr. Friedman report diagnosing Miller with chronic 
industrial bronchitis and hypertensive cardiovascular 
disease). By contrast, a review of the opinions quoting 
reports by Dr. Latimer indicates that the sole repetitive 
portion of Dr. Latimer's report on Miller is Dr. Latimer's 
conclusion that "[t]he patient is totally and permanently 
disabled as a psychophysiological working unit." See, e.g., 
Taybron v. Harris, 667 F.2d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 1981)(quoting 
Dr. Latimer report concluding "[a]s an industrial unit he 
should be considered totally disabled . . . ."); Cruz-Santos v. 
Callahan, 1998 WL 175936, *3 (D.N.J. 1998)(quoting Dr. 
Latimer report concluding that patient is a "totally and 
permanently disabled psychophysiological working unit 
. . . ."). Because a physician's ultimate conclusion on 
disability is not binding on an ALJ, Dr. Latimer's repetitive 
conclusions as to disability do not cast the same degree of 
doubt on the non-repetitive substantive portions of his 
report as the repetitive diagnoses cast on the overall merits 
of the reports of Doctors Pollock and Friedman. 
 
In addition, unlike the reports of Doctors Pollock and 
Friedman, portions of Dr. Latimer's report find support in 
other evidence in the record. Dr. Latimer's May 21, 1993, 
report is very similar to the report of Dr. Haydon from 
December 2, 1993, upon which the Commissioner relied in 
granting Miller's disability claim. For example, Dr. Latimer 
notes that Miller was a poor historian, his cognition was 
poor, and his memory, orientation, judgment, insight, 
concentration and attention span were questionable. See 
Record at 198-99. Dr. Haydon based his diagnosis of 
amnestic disorder on Miller's unreliable memory and the 
fact that he is a poor historian. Id. at 252-54. Given the 
similarities of these reports and the fact that the 
Commissioner credited Dr. Haydon's report in awarding 
benefits, it cannot be said that Dr. Latimer's report finds no 
support in the other medical evidence of record. 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In addition, at least one Social Security Administration reviewer seems 
to have credited Dr. Latimer's report. See Record at 95 (Social Security 
Administration reviewer's report)(noting that evidence of organic mental 
disorders included Dr. Latimer's May 1993 report diagnosing Miller with 
an organic personality disorder). 
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We recognize that the ALJ stated in his decision that he 
fully reviewed the report of Dr. Latimer. Because Dr. 
Latimer's report is, at least in part, substantiated by Dr. 
Haydon's report and because there is no indication in the 
case law that Dr. Latimer's report contains carbon-copied 
diagnoses that do not take into account Miller's condition, 
however, we must conclude that the ALJ likely lumped Dr. 
Latimer's report with the reports of Doctors Pollack and 
Friedman in rejecting it without significant analysis of its 
contents. Under these circumstances, the ALJ erred in 
affording Dr. Latimer's report little weight based solely on a 
perception that his report was a typical Freeman & Bass 
boilerplate report. 
 
There are proper reasons for which the ALJ might have 
chosen not to credit Dr. Latimer's report. For example, the 
ALJ might have given it little weight because it is not 
substantiated by medical testing. In addition, the ALJ 
might have reasonably determined that Dr. Latimer's report 
was insufficient by itself to establish disability starting from 
May of 1993. Because the ALJ rejected Dr. Latimer's report 
solely on the basis that he perceived it to be a boilerplate 
report, however, we cannot say that the ALJ properly 
weighed this report. We accordingly shall remand this case 
for consideration of the merits of Dr. Latimer's report in 




For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court's order and remand this case to the District Court 
with instruction to remand to the Commissioner of Social 
Security for consideration of the relative merits of Dr. 
Latimer's report. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                8 
 
